Techniques of Bridging the Gulf: Dialectic and Reductionism in McDowell and Fichte by Lemanski, Jens
Artykuły naukowe
7
1. Introduction
Although “dialectic” is not a widely used term in contemporary analytical phi-
losophy, it has become increasingly interesting for analytic philosophers after the 
so-called Hegelian turn.1 For instance, there are some remarks in Robert Bran-
dom’s and John McDowell’s work concerning the dialectical process of Hegel.2 
This is not surprising, since dialectic as a method of theoretical philosophy has 
a great influence on the methodological investigation of topics of practical phi-
losophy, e.g. theories of role models, love or recognition.3 These remarks were also 
the starting point of new discussions about Hegelian dialectic4 and new studies 
1 Cf. T. Rockmore, Analytic Philosophy and the Hegelian Turn, “The Review of Metaphysics” 2001, 
Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 339–370, esp. pp. 359–354.
2 Cf. R. Brandom, Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality, 
Cambridge, MA 2002, p. 202 et seqq.; J. McDowell, Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, 
Hegel, and Sellars, Cambridge, MA 2009, p. 156 et seqq.
3 Cf. J. Lemanski, An Analogy between Hegel’s Theory of Recognition and Ficino’s Theory of Love, 
“British Journal for the History of Philosophy” 2019, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 95–113.
4 Cf. S. Houlgate, McDowell, Hegel, and the “Phenomenology of Spirit”, “Owl of Minerva” 2009/10, 
Vol. 41, pp. 13–26; M. Gulli Inferenzialismo e dialettica speculativa: Robert Brandom e la lettura 
critica di Hegel, “Giornale di metafisica” 2007, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 731–756; J.E. Maybee, Hegel’s 
Dialectics, in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta, 
URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/hegel-dialectics/.
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on comparisons between classical German(-language) philosophy and analytic 
philosophy.5 Most of these studies have shown that there is actually a certain dia-
lectical approach in analytic philosophy after the Hegelian turn and especially in 
the philosophy of McDowell. In the case of McDowell’s dialectic, these compari-
sons are not limited and should not be limited to Hegel, as e.g. Italo Testa or Tom 
Whyman have shown.6
Also, the present study is concerned with two paradigmatic texts on dia-
lectic in classical German(-language) philosophy and analytic philosophy, i.e. 
Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s Science of Knowing 1804 and John McDowell’s Mind 
and World. I believe that both philosophers – despite many differences – follow 
a dialectical method in order to avoid one-sided reductionistic positions in phi-
losophy. In other words, both are searching for techniques of “bridging” the 
gulf, separated by dualistic positions or concepts that reductionists use to take 
a position on one side and explain the opposite one from it. The main reason 
why Fichte’s dialectical approach was selected here instead of, e.g., Schleier- 
macher’s, Hegel’s, or Adorno’s,7 is a  systematic one: I  believe that Fichte’s Sci-
5 The results of these comparisons can vary between two opinions: the first is that there is no dia-
lectical approach in the “Pittsburgh neo-Hegelianism.” This point of view can be represented by 
Nektarios Limnatis, who claims: “No functional equivalent of [Hegel’s] dialectic is to be found 
in McDowell and Brandom […]” (The Dimensions of Hegel’s Dialectic, London 2010, p. 225). The 
second one refers to, e.g., a “dialectical character” of the relation between first and second nature 
in McDowell’s Mind and World that can be compared with the thought of other dialectical phi-
losophers, such as Theodor Adorno (cf. I. Testa, Criticism from Within Nature: The Dialectic Be-
tween First and Second Nature from McDowell to Adorno, “Philosophy & Social Criticism” 2007, 
Vol. 33, p. 474). For example, in 2002 Brian Morrison has claimed that McDowell “works dialec-
tically” (Mind, World and Language: McDowell and Kovesi, “Ratio: An International Journal of 
Analytic Philosophy” 2002, Vol. 15, No. 3, p. 295) and demonstrated his assertion by analyzing 
the argumentation of Mind and World. Previously, an entire study about dialectic in McDowell 
had been published by Fiona Ellis (On the Dismounting of Seesaws, “Philosophy” 2001, Vol. 76, 
No. 1, pp. 31–54).
6 Cf. I. Testa, Criticism from Within Nature, op. cit.; T. Whyman, The Irrational in the Rational, or: 
John McDowell’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, “Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philoso-
phy” 2018, pp. 1–23.
7 There are already some studies that emphasize differences and correlations between McDowell 
and Fichte (cf. G. di Giovanni, The Jacobi-Fichte-Reinhold Dialogue and Analytical Philosophy, 
“Fichte-Studien” 1998, Vol. 14, pp. 63–87; P. Dews, Nature and Subjectivity: Fichte’s Role in the 
Pippin/McDowell Debate in the Light of His Neo-Kantian Reception, “Fichte-Studien” 2010, Vol. 
35, pp. 227–243; V. Pluder, Die Vermittlung von Idealismus und Realismus in der Klassischen 
Deutschen Philosophie, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 2013), but none of these has been focused di-
rectly on the two texts mentioned here.
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ence of Knowing 1804 can make a good contribution to McDowell’s dialectical 
approach since Fichte focuses on the meta-debate between reductionism and 
anti-reductionism, which I think McDowell is losing sight of.8
Since I believe that McDowell dominates the current discussion and I under-
stand Fichte’s position as a systematic contribution to this debate, I will not pro-
ceed chronologically, but start with McDowell’s approach in Section 2 and then 
present Fichte’s position in Section 3. In both sections, I will try to give a sys-
tematic overview of their dialectic approaches in their very own formulations. 
However, for a better comparison of both positions, I will try to present the main 
results in Sections 2 and 3 in quasi-logical terms of the so-called bridge principles 
introduced by Ernest Nagel.9 (As I  will explain at certain points, a  mere logi-
cal representation of the given dialectic is problematic.) In Section 4, I interpret 
McDowell’s dialectic as an alternative to the three reductionistic positions which 
he had discovered in current philosophy (4.1). As a consequence, I will argue that 
dialectic is a positive method of anti-reductionism that is different from normal 
anti-reductionistic positions, which are often equated with theoretical holism (or 
further theoretical individualism),10 on the one hand, and which are normally 
just a negative refusal of reductionism, on the other.11 Furthermore, I will argue 
that Fichte reflects on the debate on reductionism and anti-reductionism itself 
and that in his opinion anti-reductionism has something quite similar to reduc-
tionism, so that the debate on reductionism and anti-reductionism can at least be 
interpreted as involved in dialectic argumentation (4.2). In my conclusion (Sec-
tion 5), I will point out why dialectic can be an alternative to reductionism as well 
as to normal anti-reductionism.
8 McDowell’s position often comes under suspicion of favouring the reductionistic position of 
conceptualism, even if McDowell tries to evade this reproach by making certain differentiations 
(cf. J. Browning McDowell and the Contents of Intuition, “Dialectica” 2019, Vol. 73, No. 1–2, 
pp. 83–104).
9 Cf. R. van Riel, Nagelian Reduction beyond the Nagel Model, “Philosophy of Science” 2011, Vol. 
78, No. 3, pp. 353–375.
10 Cf. R.H. Jones, Reductionism: Analysis and the Fullness of Reality, Lewisburg 2000, pp. 212–217.
11 Cf. D. Pritchard, A  Defence of Quasi-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony, “Philo-
sophica” 2006, Vol. 78, p. 20: “‘anti-reductionism’ […] implies a view which is simply the logical 
negation of reductionism rather than a positive proposal in its own right.”
Jens Lemanski
10
2. John McDowell’s “Last Dualism”
The first part of this section (2.1) describes McDowell’s criticism of the metho-
dology of recent philosophy and his counter-proposal, which is called the “natu-
ralism of second nature.” Part 2.2 is concerned with the dilemma of analytical 
epistemology in which McDowell is situated. 
2.1. The Bridge over the Gulf
In § 3 of the fifth lecture in Mind and World, McDowell describes various kinds 
of dualisms. All “familiar dualisms of modern philosophy,” he says, can be 
traced back to either a (1) “deeper dualism” or a (2) “last dualism.”12 In my view, 
both types of dualism are working terms that differ depending on their use. But 
McDowell differentiates these dualisms more precisely, gives them general titles, 
such as “phenomenalism,” “platonism,” “naturalism,” etc., and assigns them to 
specific schools or authors of analytical philosophy. In any case, each dualism 
signifies an unwelcome gulf between concepts such as subject and object, thought 
and world, or norm and nature. This means that within the dualism, each side of 
the gulf is represented by a concept that is semantically distinct from the other. 
In McDowell’s opinion, a  central aim of modern philosophy is to remove the 
differences between both sides and concepts: “Modern philosophy has taken 
itself to be called on to bridge dualistic gulfs, between subject and object, thought 
and world.”13 
In considering the technique of bridging, McDowell distinguishes between 
(1) the normal and (2) his own philosophical method. (1) The normal or ordinary 
method is a kind of “constructive philosophy” that McDowell treats as a deeper 
dualism; (2) in contrast, his own method is therapeutic14 and it refers to the 
last dualism. In the following, I will first introduce the constructive method of 
(1) deeper dualism, which is differentiated by the dualisms called “phenomena- 
lism” and “rampant platonism.” In the second step, I will present (2) the dualisms 
of “naturalized platonism” and “bald naturalism,” which already point to 
12 Cf. J. McDowell, Mind and World: With a New Introduction, 5th ed., Cambridge, MA 2000, p. 93 
et seqq. (V, § 3).
13 Ibid., p. 93 (V, § 3).
14 Cf. ibid., p. XI (Intr., § 1), p. XVI et seq. (Intr., § 5), p. XXI et seq. (Intr., § 9), p. XXIII et seq. 
(Intr., § 10), p. 92 et seqq. with Fn. 7 (V, § 3).
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McDowell’s own position of the “naturalism of second nature,” which is de-
scribed in more detail in Section 2.2.
(1) Concerning the deeper dualism, ordinary modern philosophy mediates be-
tween both sides of this dualism by favouring one side of the gulf rather than the 
other. Figuratively speaking, a philosopher stands on one favoured side and uses 
the existing conceptual material to build up the other one:
Ordinary modern philosophy addresses its derivative dualisms in a charac-
teristic way. It takes its stand on one side of a gulf it aims to bridge, accepting 
without question the way its target dualism conceives the chosen side. Then it 
constructs something as close as possible to the conception of the other side 
that figured in the problems, out of materials that are unproblematically avail-
able where it has taken its stand. Of course there no longer seems to be a gulf, 
but the result is bound to look more or less revisionist. […] If our construction 
lacks features that what posed the problem seemed to possess, that is a revi-
sionism that was only to be expected.15
For McDowell, phenomenalism (Ph) is an example of deeper dualism and the 
technique of bridging as described in the quote above: it favours one side of the 
dualism, i.e. experience (BPh), and it develops the world out of it (CPh) as an epiphe-
nomenon; but phenomenalism “aims to overcome anxiety about a gap between 
experience and the world by constructing the world out of experience, still con-
ceived in just the way that gives rise to the anxiety.”16
One can describe this position with Nagel’s definition of reductionism, such 
that phenomenalism is a reductionistic position since it is supposed to be an ex-
planation between two theories, in which one of these theories can be derived 
from the other by using bridge principles.17 In the following, I use a quasi-logical 
interpretation of bridge principles including conditionals and biconditionals, 
which are not atypical in the current debate on reductionism.18 It should be noted, 
15 Ibid., p. 94 et seq. (V, § 3).
16 Ibid.
17 Cf. R. van Riel, R. van Gulick, Scientific Reduction, in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Winter 2019 Edition), ed. E.N. Zalta, URL: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/
scientific-reduction/, sect. 2.2.1.
18 Cf., e.g., M. Esfeld, C. Sachse, P. Soom, Marrying the Merits of Nagelian Reduction and Func-
tional Reduction, “Acta Analytica” 2012, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 217–230. Instead of “imply” in bridge 
principles one can also read “reduced to.”
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however, that for much-discussed reasons these syntactical statements cannot be 
interpreted as fragments of a particular formal system of logic:
(Ph) It is not the case that BPh equals CPh. However, BPh may imply CPh. 
In its most extreme form, the deeper dualism is to be bridged by “rampant 
platonism” (RP).19 This philosophical position represents an extreme because its 
dualism contains a “spooky” or “supersensible”20 side on which we can find su-
pernatural and transcendent ideas. 
Borrowing an expression from Hegel, we could say that “rampant platonism” 
contains on the one side an “absolute Beyond,”21 “something that can not be 
found”;22 but, on the other side, there is an immanent process – trying to con-
struct the transcendence – which, however, “does not completely attain its goal 
in the present”:23
Now any platonism has the effect that norms are on the far side of a gulf, and 
that sets a philosophical task with a familiar shape: to build as close a likeness 
as possible to what threatened to seem out of reach, using only materials that 
are reassuringly present on the hither side of the threatening gulf. The aim is 
that the gulf should disappear. If our construction lacks features that what 
posed the problem seemed to possess, that is a revisionism that was only to 
be expected.24
For McDowell, we cannot construct the transcendent side (CRP) out of exten-
sional materials which belong to the other, immanent side (BRP) of the gulf, and 
therefore it is not possible for rampant platonism to bridge the gap. In terms of 
bridge principles, one can sum up:
(RP) It is not the case that BRP equals CRP. However, BRP may not imply CRP.
(2) However, the situation is different with the positions of the last dualism. 
McDowell criticizes the fact that ordinary modern philosophy reads a deeper du-
19 Cf. J. McDowell, Mind and World, op. cit., pp. 77–85 (IV, §§ 6–9), p. 92 et seq. (V, § 3), p. 110 
(VI, § 1), p. 123 (VI, § 7). 
20 Ibid., p. 82 (IV, § 7), pp. 92–95 (V, § 3), p. 176 (III, § 1).
21 G.W.F. Hegel, Faith and Knowledge, trans. W. Cerf et al., Albany, NY 1977, p. 147.
22 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller, Oxford 1977, p. 131 (§ 217).
23 Ibid., p. 326 (§ 534).
24 J. McDowell, Mind and World, op. cit., p. 94 (V, § 3).
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alism into Ludwig Wittgenstein’s writings, and does not recognize that Wittgen-
stein transforms the transcendent and “rampant platonism” into a “naturalized” 
one.25 In view of this, both sides come to resemble each other more and more, 
and for precisely that reason Wittgenstein’s “naturalized platonism” illustrates 
nothing more than the last dualism. Furthermore, McDowell observes this natu-
ralized platonism also in Aristotle’s ethics.26 He combines both philosophies with 
the concepts of Bildung and Erziehung, which at first glance seem to correspond 
to Richard Rorty’s “edification.”27 But before addressing this similarity in greater 
detail, it is necessary to gain a better idea of what exactly “naturalized platonism” 
means.
“Naturalized platonism” (NP) seems to be a special type of platonism that of-
fers an alternative to the one-sided construction of the deeper dualism and the 
unbridgeable or insurmountable rampant platonism since in neither side seems 
to be the “absolute Beyond” of its opposite. Thus naturalized platonism28 focuses 
on both sides of the dualism (BNP, CNP) equally and claims that each side of the 
gulf is just an expansion of the other. With the help of bridge principles one could, 
therefore, express this two-sided reductionism by using the following statement: 
(NP) It is not the case that BNP is not equal to CNP. Therefore, it is the case 
that CNP is implied from BNP and BNP is implied from CNP.
For McDowell, this special kind of platonism has already been mentioned in 
an aphorism of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: “Commanding, ques-
tioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a part of our natural history as walk-
ing, eating, drinking, playing.”29 By referring to this aphorism, the differences 
between the two types of platonism can be made clear. Ordinary platonism states 
25 Cf. ibid., p. 91 (V, § 3), p. 110 (VI, § 1). However, a similar interpretation of Wittgenstein can be 
found in A.S. Janik, Wie hat Schopenhauer Wittgenstein beeinflußt?, “Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch” 
1992, Vol. 73, pp. 69–78.
26 J. McDowell, Mind and World, op. cit., p. 78 et seqq. (IV, § 7).
27 Ibid., p. 87 (IV, § 7); R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton, NY 1980, p. 360: 
“Since ‘education’ sounds a bit too flat, and Bildung a bit too foreign, I shall use ‘edification’ to 
stand for this project of finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking.”
28 The assignment of naturalized platonism to the deeper or last dualism is not fully clear. On the 
one hand, constructivist traits can be seen here, but, on the other hand, the mediating structure 
already refers to the position McDowell favours.
29 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations: English &  German, 2nd ed., trans. G.E.M. Ans-
combe, Oxford 1997, p. 12e (§ 25).
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that ideal or mental entities are outside and beyond the reality and world. But, 
concerning Wittgenstein and Aristotle, McDowell claims that ideas and mental 
entities can be interpreted as normal and non-transcendent processes, which are 
natural to human nature and behaviour: commanding, questioning, recounting, 
chatting are part of our nature, and this extended concept of nature is called 
“second nature.”30 
Consequently, the last dualism of this “naturalism of second nature”31 pro-
vides an alternative to the deeper and derived dualism because McDowell con-
nects both sides of the dualism “mind and world,” “idea and nature” by natu-
ralizing the spooky side and without favouring just one of both sides. But the 
naturalism of second nature also stopped short of a reductive or “bald natural-
ism” (BN) in which the formerly transcendent side (CBN) is totally unenchanted 
by the naturalized one (BBN):
(BN) It is not the case that BBN is not equal to CBN.  
Therefore, BBN implies CBN.
Therefore, the naturalism of second nature upholds that keeping nature “par-
tially enchanted”32 is necessary – otherwise “we shall certainly need to work 
at bringing meaning back into the picture when we come to consider human 
interactions.”33 Hence, the naturalism of second nature is neither a  one-sided 
construction, like in rampant platonism, nor a one-sided destruction, like in bald 
naturalism. Rather, it is a therapeutic attempt to partially “exorcize” the spooki-
ness of the more transcendent side, thereby revealing the process of Bildung:
Now it is not even clearly intelligible to suppose a  creature might be born 
at home in the space of reasons. Human beings are not: they are born mere 
animals, and they are transformed into thinkers and intentional agents in the 
course of coming to maturity. This transformation risks looking mysterious. 
But we can take it in our stride if, in our conception of the Bildung that is 
a central element in the normal maturation of human beings, we give pride of 
place to the learning of language.34
30 Cf. J. McDowell, Mind and World, op. cit., p. XX (Intr., § 8), p. 84 et seq. (IV, § 7).
31 Cf. ibid., p. 94 et seq., p. 98 (V, § 3).
32 Cf. ibid., p. 85 (IV, § 8).
33 Cf. ibid., p. 72 (IV, § 3).
34 Cf. ibid., p. 125 (VI, § 7).
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Unlike Rorty’s philosophy of sudden transformation,35 McDowell’s concepts 
of Bildung and Erziehung signify constant processes occurring within the side of 
first nature and the emergence of the side of second nature. Therefore, Bildung 
becomes the principle of bridging as well as separating both sides of the gulf. 
2.2. Solving the Constructive Dilemma 
The naturalism of second nature is not only an alternative to the deeper dualism; 
it also provides an answer to the conceptualist question – discussed by Wilfrid 
Sellars, Gareth Evans and Donald Davidson – of why nature seems to be struc-
tured by concepts. Simply said: nature appears to be conceptualized because we 
are, with our conceptual abilities, a part of nature.36 To see the advantage of the 
naturalism of second nature we have to go back to the beginning of Mind and 
World. There, McDowell has shown a dualism and a dialectic between the co-
herence theory of Davidson and Evans’s modified myth of the given. Instead of 
deciding arbitrarily between these two unwanted theories that form a construc-
tive dilemma,37 McDowell offers a third way, which has a therapeutic effect on 
both theories or positions. The reason why McDowell was unable to make a com-
mitment to Evans or Davidson lies in the fact that the position of the former 
would necessarily tend towards the non-conceptual, and the latter has to approve 
a deeper dualism which leads – in the worst case – to rampant platonism:
We are confronted with the dilemma whose horns are embraced by Davidson 
and Evans, each of them, I claim, deceived in the thought that his position is 
satisfactory. We can avoid the dilemma. We do not need to say that we have 
what mere animals have, non-conceptual content, and we have something else 
as well, since we can conceptualize that content and they cannot.38
Both philosophers together form a deeper dualism because each of them takes 
his stand on one side of the gulf between mind and world. Thus, recent philosophy 
35 Cf. R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, op. cit., pp. 359, 360.
36 Cf. in detail S.  Heßbrüggen-Walter, Spontaneity and Causality: McDowell on the Passivity of 
Perception, in: John McDowell: Reason and Nature: Lecture and Colloquium in Münster 1999, ed. 
M. Willaschek, Münster 2000, pp. 21–27.
37 McDowell (Mind and World, op. cit., p. 62 (III, § 6): “[…] Davidson and Evans represent the two 
horns of a dilemma […]”; p. 68 (IV, § 1): “horn of the dilemma”) refers sometimes to the classical 
concept of “cornutus” (Diog. Laert. II.108f., 135; VI.38; VII.187).
38 Ibid., p. 64 (III, § 7).
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shows a dialectical movement between each of the two sides, each in turn repre-
sented by one of the two philosophers. McDowell refuses to accept a theory of the 
non-conceptual, like Evans’s myth of the given, by having recourse to Kant’s slo-
gan “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” 
and Sellars’s kind of inferentialism,39 which does not transcend the logical space 
of reason.40 Davidson’s coherence theory shows a certain tendency to describe the 
human mind as an excluded by-product or separate epiphenomenon of nature. 
Thus, McDowell’s refusals result from his “philosophical anxieties”41 that Evans 
falls back into classical metaphysics and ontology,42 while the deeper dualism in 
Davidson’s coherentism runs the risk of becoming a form of supernaturalism.43
Because of this, McDowell has – since the first pages of Mind and World – 
committed himself to a third position beyond the one-sided alternatives of Evans 
and Davidson. This third position attempts to cure the philosophical oscillation 
and dialectic between the myth of the given and coherentism in order to allow 
both sides to calm down.44 But how can terms, notions, and ideas of the tran-
scendent side relate to our immanent state? McDowell gives a surprising answer 
to this question:
We should understand what Kant calls “intuition”– experiential intake – not 
as a bare getting of an extra-conceptual Given, but as a kind of occurrence or 
state that already has conceptual content.45
39 Cf. W. Sellars, Inference and Meaning, “Mind” 1953, Vol. 62, pp. 313–338.
40 Cf. J. McDowell, Mind and World, op. cit., p. XIV (Intr., § 4).
41 Ibid., p. XII (Intr., § 2).
42 This interpretation can be backed by pointing to the historical background. Michael Dummett 
had proclaimed against Evans in Origins of Analytical Philosophy, Cambridge, MA 1993, p. 4: 
“A good example of this new trend is Gareth Evans’s posthumous book [The Varieties of Refer-
ence], which essays an account, independent of language, of what it is to think about an object in 
each of various ways, and then seeks to explain the different verbal means of effecting reference 
to an object in terms of these ways of thinking about is. On my characterisation, therefore, Evans 
was no longer an analytical philosopher.” Dummett’s criticism of Evans may also be read as or 
transformed to a criticism addressed to McDowell. Therefore, McDowell immunized his theory 
in the last chapter of Mind and World (VI, § 8) against this anti-analytical argument of Dummett 
and also against a fall-back into classical metaphysics and ontology.
43 Cf. J. McDowell, Mind and World, op. cit., p. 78 (IV, § 6), p. 84 (IV, § 7), further: p. 88 (V, § 1).
44 Cf. ibid., p. 9 (I, § 3), p. 13 (I, § 6), p. 76 (IV, § 5), p. 86 (IV, § 8), p. 95 (V, § 3), p. 177 (III, § 2); 
cf. F. Ellis, On the Dismounting of Seesaws, op. cit.
45 Cf. J. McDowell, Mind and World, op. cit., p. 9 (I, § 4).
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In experience one finds oneself saddled with content. One’s conceptual ca-
pacities have already been brought into play, in the content’s being available to 
one, before one has any choice in the matter.46
Already at the end of his first lecture, McDowell can demonstrate the advan-
tages of his own position. The advantage is especially shown in the fact that there 
is an alternative to Evans and Davidson:
In this lecture, I have claimed that we are prone to fall into an intolerable os-
cillation: in one phase we are drawn to a coherentism that cannot make sense 
of the bearing of thought on objective reality, and in the other phase we recoil 
into an appeal to the Given, which turns out to be useless. I have urged that in 
order to escape the oscillation, we need a conception of experiences as states 
or occurrences that are passive but reflect conceptual capacities, capacities 
that belong to spontaneity, in operation.47 
Firstly, it looks like he wishes to avoid the non-conceptual by establishing 
a mysterious anteriority of the concept (in contrast to nature):48 every experience 
and impression we make already has conceptual content, and therefore they may 
be “passively received.” Unavoidably, we have to ask ourselves: where do the con-
cepts come from which are anterior to the outside world with which they are in 
contact, and which are anterior to us who have exclusively the ability to produce 
awareness of concepts? McDowell’s reference to Kant’s spontaneity (as a  solu-
tion to this problem) is not satisfactory without a prior explanation of the “natu- 
ralism of second nature.” Given that McDowell naturalizes conceptual ability or 
spontaneity in the form of higher oneness by following the “naturalism of second 
nature” (NN), as we have seen above, his position – which should be an alterna-
tive to Evans and Davidson – loses its air of mystery. Simply said, again: nature 
(BNN) seems to have conceptual content (CNN) because we are – as concept users 
(CNN) – a part of nature (BNN). Since both sides of this apparent gulf can now be 
related to each other, the semantic bridging principle of Bildung or Erziehung can 
be interpreted in the form of the following biconditional:
46 Ibid., p. 10 (I, § 5).
47 Ibid., p. 23 (I, § 8).
48 This would be a modern version of idealism similar to Fichte’s early work in which the “I” posits 
the “not-I,” or to Hegel’s late work in which nature is just a repetition of the logos.
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(NN) It is not the case that BNN is not equal to CNN.  
Then and only then BNN implies CNN iff CNN implies BNN.
McDowell meets not only the requirement of Kant and Sellars but also 
makes allowance for Michael Dummett’s claim “that the fundamental tenet of 
analytic philosophy is that philosophical questions about thought are to be ap-
proached through language.”49 By naturalizing the concept or conceptual ability, 
McDowell offers again a third position as an alternative to Davidson’s coherent-
ism and Evans’s myth of the given. In this way, the deeper dualism between mind 
and world, conceptual spontaneity and nature will be transformed in an absolute 
oneness in which the side of the concept is an expansion of the other side of na-
ture, and both sides shall be combined and separated by the constant process of 
Bildung, which acts as a principium divisionis as well as a principium identitatis. 
Through this naturalism of second nature, represented by Bildung that connects 
both sides of the gulf, the seesaw of recent philosophy should be dismounted and 
the dialectic should come to an end.
3. Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s “Absolute Oneness”
In 1804, Johann Gottlieb Fichte presents the first definitive account of the science 
of knowing (Wissenschaftslehre). The overall project of the Science of Knowing 
1804 is characterized by Fichte as a “complete solution of the riddle of the world 
and of the consciousness with mathematical evidence” (“vollständige Lösung des 
Rätsels der Welt mit mathematischer Evidenz”).50 His basic thesis is that the solu-
tion of that riddle can only be achieved by reciprocally conceiving “multiplicity 
through oneness and oneness through multiplicity.”51 If we let B signify “multi-
plicity” and C “oneness,” then we can formulate the hypothesis about the dialecti-
49 J. McDowell, Mind and World, op. cit., p. 124 (VI, § 8).
50 Cf. J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre: Zweiter Vortrag im Jahre 1804, in: Gesamtausgabe der 
Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vol. II/8, eds. R. Lauth, H. Gliwitzky, Stuttgart 1985, 
p. XX, Fn. 13; This translation is my own. The outstanding position of Science of Knowing 1804 
in Fichte’s late work is made particularly clear by Patrick Tschirner in Totalität und Dialektik. 
Johann Gottlieb Fichtes späte Wissenschaftslehre oder die lebendige Existenz des Absoluten als sich 
selbst bildendes Bild, Berlin 2017, esp. § 3.
51 J.G. Fichte, The Science of Knowing: J.G. Fichte’s 1804 Lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre, trans. 
W.E. Wright, Albany, NY 2005, p. 24 (= J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., pp. 8, 23 
et seq.).
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cal structure of the Science of Knowing 1804, which is similar to what McDowell 
offers in Mind and World.
The Science of Knowing 1804 is thematically and methodically divided into 
two general parts: the first part refers to logic (“doctrine of truth or reason”)52 
and goes bottom-up from multiplicity to oneness by criticizing the established 
philosophical methods of his time. The details of this part will be discussed in 
Section 3.1. The second part refers to phenomenology (“doctrine of appearance”) 
and it is a foundation of knowing by leading from oneness top-down to multi-
plicity. This second primary theme of Fichte’s later writing will be discussed in 
Section 3.2. 
3.1. The Bottom-Up Logic
In the first part of the Science of Knowing 1804 Fichte begins his search for “abso-
lute oneness” (absoluten Einheit)53 which does not turn out to be an “unperceived 
disjunction” (nicht wahrgenommenen Disjunktion).54 But before Fichte gives his 
insight about this absolute oneness, he shows why all the methods which were 
already well-established in the history of philosophy have to fail: oneness and 
multiplicity (Einheit und Mannigfaltigkeit),55 thinking and being (Denken und 
Sein),56 or sensibility and supersensibility (Sinnliches und Übersinnliches),57 etc., 
are common disjunctions and familiar dualisms in philosophy for which me-
diations may be sought; and these mediation attempts are called “connection” 
(Band)58 or “point of oneness” (Einheitspunkt).59 First of all, Fichte holds that 
semantic connotations are unimportant60 in investigating the relationship be-
52 Doctrine of reason (Vernunftlehre) and doctrine of truth (Wahrheitslehre) are typical synonyms 
for “logic” in the 18th century; cf. W. Risse, Logik I, 6. (art.), in: Historisches Wörterbuch der 
Philosophie, vol. 5, ed. J. Ritter, Basel 1980, pp. 359–360.
53 J.G. Fichte, The Science of Knowing 1804, p. 23 (= J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., 
p. 8.4–27).
54 Ibid., p. 25 (= J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., p. 10.22 et seq.).
55 Cf. ibid., p. 23 et seqq. (= J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., p. 8.4 et seqq.).
56 Cf. ibid., p. 25 et seqq. (= J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., p. 12.5 et seqq.).
57 Cf. ibid., p. 31 et seqq. (= J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., p. 26.30 et seqq.).
58 Cf., e.g., ibid., p. 28 (= J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., p. 20.9).
59 Cf., e.g., ibid., p. 41 (= J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., p. 52.27).
60 Cf. ibid., p. 60 (= J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., p. 94.30–33): “Thus away with all 
words and signs! Nothing remains except our living thinking and insight, which can’t be shown 
on a blackboard nor be represented in any way but can only be surrendered to nature.”
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tween concepts in disjunctions. What is more decisive is that all of the concepts 
mentioned (e.g. thinking and being) are complements or subordinate terms (Ne-
benglieder/Seitenglieder) of disjunctions which could be symbolically represented 
by B and C. In Fichte’s opinion, the mediation, the connection, or point of one-
ness – sometimes represented by him with the letter α61 – were not found by 
his predecessors (such as Spinoza, Jacobi, Kant, Reinhold, or Hegel). Therefore, 
Fichte tries to prove this hypothesis by using several methods: (1) one method 
focuses on one side of the disjunction and it is claimed that this side is α (or has 
the property or value α); (2) another method does not focus on one side of the 
disjunction and it is claimed that α is independent of the disjunction.
(1) First, Fichte follows the method of prominent philosophies and focuses on 
one side of the distinction by identifying this side with the absolute oneness that 
has been sought. Preferring one side of the distinction will only be possible if the 
other side is negated. In recognizing that this principle of simultaneous affirma-
tion and negation can be applied to either side of the distinction, Fichte rightly 
claims that focusing on one side cannot be the method to find the connection (α) 
or absolute oneness.
An example may be used to illustrate the first problem that Fichte sees in this 
method:62 Let B and C denote two subordinate terms of a distinction. And let 
α signify the absolute oneness which is either with B or C. If a philosopher de-
cides to, e.g., state that B is the absolute (α), this can only be done by negating or 
subtracting C. This equation of B with the property α works if and only if C is ne- 
gated, abstracted, or subtracted. But based on this premise, α cannot be attrib-
uted to B because then the absolute oneness (α as B) would be in relation to C and 
then it would no longer be an absolute oneness. Furthermore, the philosopher 
can only make the decision to state that B is the absolute on semantic grounds. 
However, C may also be entitled to be the absolute as B, and every problem de-
scribed above that applies to B also applies to C. 
The exact logical representation of this problem is tricky due to several rea-
sons. First, the absolute can be understood as a value or property of a variable or 
term, which itself stands for a judgement about the syntax.63 As with many think-
61 Cf., e.g., ibid., p. 24 (= J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., p. 8.22–27).
62 There are more problems which cannot be mentioned here.
63 A similar problem concerning the mixing of syntax and semantics has also been noticed by sev-
eral authors in Hegel’s dialectic (cf. J.E. Maybee, Hegel’s Dialectics, op. cit., Sect. 3). The ontologi-
cal structure, which Fichte analyzes, can be set up as a formal system (cf. J. Lemanski, L. Jansen, 
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ers of this epoch, this is the attraction, but also the problem of interpretation. 
Second, it is not clear which logical rules Fichte accepts and which he does not.64 
This makes an interpretation with means of current logic problematic. 
Fichte also describes this problem as a problem of understanding or defining 
positions and concepts. Every side of a disjunction or every subordinate term has 
not only an extension and intension, but rather a complement term – this is the 
other term within the disjunction – by which it is defined. The importance of the 
complement term can be seen in the act of understanding or explaining (similar 
to the definitio genetica sive causalis): we only fully understand or explain con-
cepts or subordinate terms by understanding or explaining what they are not.65 
To understand a  single subordinate term we, therefore, need the complement 
term, and it seems to be impossible to state that just one subordinate term could 
be the absolute oneness since this term always depends on the other side of the 
disjunction. For example, to understand the term “absolute” (α), we have to un-
derstand what “relative” means (¬α).66 Fichte describes this behaviour of concepts 
or subordinate terms as “reciprocal influence” (gegenseitige Bedingtheit).67
(2) This problem also arises if a is not totally identified with B or C. In order to 
clarify the situation, Fichte proposes to examine the disjunction of idealism and 
realism (Chapters 11–14). In this case, a is neither an idealism (B) nor a realism 
(C) but rather, e.g., a “higher realism” in which idealism and realism are united.68 
But this higher realism (C1) underlies a reciprocal influence of a “higher ideal-
ism” (B1), so that both are subordinate terms of a higher disjunction.
69 However, 
Calculus CL as a Formal System, in: Diagrammatic Representation and Inference: 11th Interna-
tional Conference, Diagrams 2020, Tallinn, Estonia, August 24–28, 2020, Proceedings, eds. A.-V. 
Pietarinen et al., Cham 2020, pp. 445–460), but then it no longer corresponds to all statements 
of Fichte.
64 Cf. P. Tschirner, Totalität und Dialektik, op. cit., p. 202 et seqq.
65 Here too, Fichte takes up and modifies classical dialectical principles, such as “determinatio 
negatio est” or “verum index sui et falsi (et falsum index sui et veri).”
66 Since for Fichte the same applies to the syntax level (see above, prop. 4), from the point of view 
of modern logic this results in the mixing of syntax and semantics. In particular, I see a mixture 
of the law of excluded middle and the principle of bivalence in Fichte.
67 J.G. Fichte, The Science of Knowing 1804, p. 64 (= J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., 
p. 104.22).
68 Such a  union succeeds, e.g., through disjunction (cf. J. Lemanski, L. Jansen, Calculus CL as 
a Formal System, op. cit.). If this semantic assignment is inverted, a union by conjunction is also 
possible.
69 The indices indicate the hierarchical level: the higher the level, the more subordinated disjunc-
tions are under one term.
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the absolute (α) cannot be found in the disjunction with the index 1, i.e. B1 or C1, 
and also not in the even higher disjunction (e.g. B2 or C2). The method in which 
α is not identified with Bi or Ci goes bottom-up in infinitum and the absolute is 
still being sought. In this way, one can find a higher but not an absolute oneness.
Up to now, we have seen that Fichte has examined several methods of finding 
absolute oneness, but without success. As a result, he has learned that there is an 
“insurmountable duality” (unüberwindliche Zweiheit)70 if he follows the classical 
methods of philosophy. Consequently, a completely new method has to be used. 
Fichte, therefore, proposes the following:
The science of knowing does even better than they wish, according to rigorous 
methods and in the shortest possible way. It does not cut off errors individu-
ally, since it is evident that in this work as soon as error is removed on one side 
it springs up on the other; rather it insists on cutting off the single root for all 
the various branches. For now, the science of knowing asks for patience and 
that one not sympathize with the individual appearances of disease, which 
[our science] has no wish to heal: if only the inner man is first healed, then 
these individual appearances will take care of themselves.71
This is a prime example of Fichte’s radical therapeutic technique in his late 
philosophy: not every singular phenomenon or disjunction has to be bridged. 
Moreover, the principle of phenomena and disjunctions must be found and ex-
amined. Fichte thus reflects on the methods used to overcome the insurmount-
able duality:
Our procedure is almost always this: 
a. we perform something, undoubtedly led in this process by a  rule of rea-
son which operates immediately in us. What in this case we really are in our 
highest peak, and that in which we culminate, is still only facticity. 
b. we then search out and reveal the law which guided us mechanically in the 
initial action. Hence, we see mediately into what we previously had seen into 
immediately, on the basis of its principle and the ground of its being as it is; 
and we penetrate it in the origin {Genesis} of its determinateness. In this way 
we will ascend from factical terms to genetic ones. These genetic elements can 
70 J.G. Fichte, The Science of Knowing 1804, p. 35 (= J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., 
p. 40.30f.).
71 Ibid., p. 77 (= J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., p. 136.6–16).
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themselves become factical in another perspective, in which case we would be 
compelled again in connection with this new facticity to ascend genetically, 
until we arrive at the absolute source, the source of the science of knowing.72 
Fichte’s own method consists in finding the principle of all disjunctions. For-
mulated in a more logical way, his question can be articulated this way: how do 
relations between concepts or subordinate terms work and why are there any? 
Due to the above-mentioned semantic principle, concepts or subordinate terms 
such as B or C already behave disjunctively to each other (B is equivalent to not C) 
so that they are structured in such a way that they already imply each other. This 
is conveyed by the expression “reciprocal influence” of subordinate terms, and as 
a result Fichte states: “The concept’s inward and completely immutable essence 
has already been acknowledged […] as a ‘through’ [Durch]” and this “through” is 
defined as “the transition that it makes from one to another.”73 If the “through” 
(δια) is the inward life and essence of the concept (λόγος), then dia-lectic 
(δια-λεκτικὴ) governs in all domains of signs and language, semiotic and logic. 
Fichte has thereby found in dialectic “the single root for all the various branches” 
which can now be “cut off” by a single determinate negation. This negatio simplex 
of subordinate terms or variables ({¬B, ¬C, ¬B1, …} equals ¬α) leads, as an “ab-
straction from relatedness,” to “the very abstraction” (¬¬α) which is expressed 
in the “single insight” that absolute oneness is an “esse in mero actu”74 which 
is beyond all subordinate terms because it is itself subordinating every term or 
concept.
3.2. The Top-Down Phenomenology
Lectures 15 and 16 (including the basic proposition75) mark the transition to the 
second part of the Science of Knowing 1804, and the “single insight” exhibited 
there is the terminus a quo of the top-down phenomenology as well as the gen-
esis76 by which the construction and formation of the disjunctions can be ex-
72 Ibid., p. 51 (= J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., p. 76.7–19).
73 Ibid., p. 84 (= J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., p. 154.12; p. 154.23 et seq.).
74 Ibid., p. 116 (= J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., p. 228.30).
75 Ibid., p. 121 (= J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., p. 242.1–3): “Being is entirely a self-
enclosed singularity {Singulum} of immediately living being that can never get outside itself.”
76 “Genesis” is the Greek word for “enactment,” “Tathandlung”; cf. ibid., p. 106 (= J.G. Fichte, Die 
Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., p. 202.18–204.8).
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plained. Whereas previously absolute oneness was sought in the lowly spheres of 
the disjunctions, Fichte has now the objective of deepening the understanding 
of the disjunctions by deducing them from absolute oneness. In Lecture 20, the 
so-called schema of “ from”77 illustrates the structure of the disjunctions: each 
subordinate term (e.g. B1, C1) acts as a higher oneness of two more subordinate 
terms of a deeper disjunction (B0, C0). Each of these two subordinate terms acts 
itself as a higher oneness of two more subordinate terms (B-1, C-1) and ad infini-
tum. As before, Fichte has to reflect on the genetic principle of the disjunction, 
since the structure of subordinate terms T is infinite in both directions, ascend-
ing (Tn+1) and descending (Tn-1). 
With regard to the upper disjunction, each subordinate term constructs 
a deeper disjunction (e.g. C1 implies B0 or C0); with respect to the lower disjunc-
tion, both subordinate terms construct a  higher oneness (e.g. B0 or C0 implies 
C1). Therefore, it is not possible to say if a term is primarily part of a “primordial 
construction” (Urconstruction) or a  “re-construction” (Nachconstruction)78 and 
which relation, (C1 implies B0 or C0) or (B0 or C0 implies C1), is a primordial con-
struction and which is a  re-construction. However, the re-construction seems 
to be a copy of the primordial construction, which is, in contrast to the re-con-
struction, (etiologically) “closer” to the absolute. But every subordinate term or 
concept behaves as both a primordial construction and a re-construction. 
Knowing itself, however, and everything which should arise in it, splits itself 
absolutely into a duality, whose one term is to be the primordial, and whose 
other term is to be the reconstruction of the primordial, completely without 
any diversity of content, and so again absolutely one; differing only in the 
given form, which obviously indicates a  reciprocal relation to one another. 
(It  is really like this in every possible consciousness, if you wish to test the 
proposition there. Object, representation.)79
Due to the fact that the semantic or material content of the term or concept 
is indifferent (“completely without any diversity of content”) and only the form 
is important (“differing only in the given form”), this implies that it is equal to 
Fichte whether he signifies a term as primordially constructed or re-constructed. 
77 Ibid., p. 151 (= J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., p. 309.12 (Copia!)).
78 Ibid., p. 178 et seq. (= J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., p. 370.20 et seqq.).
79 Ibid., p. 176. (= J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., p. 367.21–27).
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It is only important and decisive that there can be no qualitative change with 
regard to content, whatever the function of the concept may be. For this reason, 
there can also be no change in the structure or construction. In other words, 
this insight is expressed by Fichte as absolute knowing (absolutes Wissen): “This 
[absolute knowing] is an ‘image-making process’ {ein Bilden} positing itself as an 
image, and positing a law of the image-making process as an explanation of the 
image.”80 Through the genesis – here described as an image-making process – ab-
solute oneness transfers its extensional materiality or content without a qualita-
tive change to every deeper disjunction that is made up of two subordinate terms 
(e.g. C1 implies B0 or C0). And each subordinate term needs the other for it to be 
understood (e.g. B0 implies C0 iff C0 implies B0).
Therefore, Fichte’s pragmatic turn in the classical German(-speaking) phi-
losophy seems to be fulfilled because the science of knowing has steadily worked 
towards the goal of a “personal transformation” (Umschaffung unserer selbst):81 
common or ordinary knowing (gewöhnliches Wissen), which believed that, e.g., 
either B implies C or C implies B, is transformed into absolute knowing, i.e. 
knowledge of the logical structures of hierarchically organized terms (represent-
ing, e.g., philosophical positions, such as idealism or realism). This knowledge 
includes propositions such as if B is a subordinated term at level 1, i.e. B1, then 
C1 is a complementary term to B1; or B is ¬C iff C is ¬B, then B and C are subor-
dinate terms of the same hierarchical level. But the science of knowing does not 
end with the pragmatic turn to absolute knowing (α) since absolute knowing is 
related to the common one (¬α).
Now, it may happen that ordinary knowing is the primordial condition for the 
genetic possibility of absolute knowing’s existence, or of the science of know-
ing. Hence, [it may happen] that its determinations can be explained simply 
from the presupposition that the science of knowing ought to arise […].82
80 Ibid., p. 180 (= J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., p. 374.28f.).
81 Ibid., p. 28 (= J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., p. 18.34): “What we genuinely com-
prehend becomes part of ourselves, and if it is a genuinely new insight, it produces a personal 
transformation. It is impossible that one not be, or that one cease to be, what one has genuinely 
become […].”
82 Ibid., p. 181 (= J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., p. 376.29–32).
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Absolute oneness and relative disjunctions (or absolute and ordinary know-
ing) together form an “organic oneness of both”83 because we cannot understand 
or explain what is absolute if we cannot also understand or explain what is rela-
tive (or ordinary). The last standpoint in Fichte’s late philosophy concerns the 
insight that the absolute (α) can only be attained by negating, abstracting, or sub-
tracting all relative disjunctions, and, furthermore, that the absolute has to fall 
back again in its relationship to the relative (¬α). From the point of view of the 
whole science of knowing, the relative and the absolute remain (in themselves) in 
a state of reciprocal influence (α implies ¬α iff ¬α implies α); but from the singu-
lar point of view the relative can (for us) be transformed or reduced bottom-up 
to the absolute (¬α implies α), and the absolute can be transformed top-down to 
the relative (α implies ¬α).
4. Dialectic in McDowell and Fichte
In this section, I  will discuss two main arguments and topics: in Section 4.1, 
I will interpret McDowell’s approach as an argument that dialectic is a kind of 
anti-reductionism which is not necessarily identical with holism (or further with 
individualism). Concerning the reasoning, I am rather of the opinion that dialec-
tic can express a certain positive method that could be superior to other forms of 
anti-reductionisms. I want to stress with Fichte, in Section 4.2, that dialectic does 
not cease as an anti-reductionistic position which is opposed to certain reduc-
tionisms. Furthermore, dialectic can be interpreted as a method of examining 
the relationship of reductionism and anti-reductionism itself.
4.1. Dialectic as a Kind of Anti-Reductionism
In Section 2, five positions were analyzed: phenomenalism (Ph) and rampant pla-
tonism (RP), as two kinds of a deeper dualism, as well as naturalized platonism 
(NP), bald naturalism (BN) and the naturalism of second nature (NN), as three 
kinds of a last dualism. I will list the individual bridging principles here, but will 
omit the index since the assignment of the two variables to the respective dual-
isms should be clear:
83 Ibid., p. 41 (= J.G. Fichte, Die Wissenschaftslehre, op. cit., p. 54.8f.).
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(1) Kinds of Deeper Dualism
(Ph) It is not the case that B equals C. However, B may imply C. 
(RP) It is not the case that B equals C. However, B may not imply C. 
(2) Kinds of Last Dualism
(NP) It is not the case that B is not equal to C. Therefore, it is the case that 
C is implied from B and B is implied from C.
(BN) It is not the case that B is not equal to C. Therefore, B implies C.
(NN) It is not the case that B is not equal to C. Then and only then B im-
plies C iff C implies B.
Both kinds of deeper dualism differ from the last dualism by their premises 
and antecedents: whereas (Ph) and (RP) took the premises that it is not the case 
that B equals C, (NP), (BN), and (NN) hold that it is the case that B is equal to 
C.84 The fact that (BN) shows similarity to both kinds of the deeper dualism and 
that McDowell argues for (NN) is based on the consequences: like (Ph) and (RP), 
(BN) stands on one side of the gulf (B) and construes the other one (C) out of it. 
This methodological strategy of constructing or bridging, which I have described 
in quasi-logical terms, e.g. B implies C, can be characterized as an argumenta-
tive attribute of reductionism: (Ph) takes its stand (B) on experience, (RP) on 
immanence, and (BN) on the natural world, and all three together try to involve 
opposite positions (C), such as world, transcendence, or mind. 
Following McDowell, all three reductionisms are mainly differentiated from 
one another in that they use semantically different concepts for their reduction-
istic starting point (B) and their targeted objective (C), on the one hand, and that 
they fail because of different results, on the other. Whereas the former differentia-
tion can be regarded as unimportant since it just relates to the extensional force of 
the respective concept, the latter differentiation concerning the fallibility of each 
reductionism is more interesting. It is not impossible to interpret McDowell’s 
84 As was hopefully evident from Section 2, McDowell sees equality between B and C under differ-
ent aspects, sometimes as a semantic equality, sometimes as an extensional equality, equality at 
the level of phenomena, etc. Here, however, an attempt has been made to present this always by 
using the expression of implication.
Jens Lemanski
28
discussion of the three reductionisms as having anti-reductionistic arguments 
(e.g.  the anti-reductionistic argument of inexplicable phenomena which corre-
sponds to the spooky side of platonism), but I think that they fail for another rea-
son. Each of the three positions of reductionism can be associated with one of the 
three forms of the Agrippa trilemma: (Ph) fails because its result is identical to 
the premise (circularity); (RP) fails because its premise requires that B can never 
reach C so that no result can be found (progressus ad infinitum); and (BN) claims 
dogmatically that C has always been part of B (assumption).
As a consequence of the fallibility of each reductionism, it is expected that 
McDowell opts for an anti-reductionistic position, and anti-reductionistic posi-
tions are often equated with holism (or sometimes with individualism).85 But to 
claim holism (or individualism) instead of reductionism would be nothing else 
than another kind of dogmatic assumption and, therefore, argumentatively simi-
lar to bald naturalism. This problem has previously been highlighted by Dun-
can Pritchard, as I have mentioned in Section 1: anti-reductionism, as the word 
indicates, would only be a negation or denial of reductionism, without offering 
a positive argumentative method. Furthermore, if one identifies anti-reduction-
ism with holism (or individualism), it is to be assumed that normally reasoning 
for anti-reductionism is just a reversal of reductive argumentation: since it is ac-
cepted that one side of the gulf is constructed by the other one, both sides apply 
equally. 
I believe that McDowell’s (NN) is a kind of anti-reductionism that neither in-
verts the reductive argumentation nor simply negates reductionism.86 Like (RP) 
and dissimilar to (Ph) and (BN), (NN) does neither claim that B does not equal 
C (Ph) nor B equals C (BN). Of course, one can expect now that (NN) is liable 
to the same problem as (RP), i.e. that there is “something that can not be found” 
(Hegel), so that the argumentation goes ad infinitum. But McDowell exemplifies 
with the binary opposite concepts of mind (Davidson) and world (Evans) that the 
result is given in the process itself. I repeat the consequence of Section 2 in simi-
lar words: the world (B) is a part of the mind (C) since the mind (C) is a part of 
the world (B): B implies C iff C implies B. In contrast to (RP), (NN) demonstrates 
with the concepts of “mind” and “world” that C is something that can be found 
85 Cf., e.g., J. Mittelstraß, Theoria: Chapters in the Philosophy of Science, Berlin 2018, Chap. 1.
86 As in many theoretical debates in analytical philosophy, the binary positions can easily be ex-
changed, e.g. in the following, reductionism and non-reductionism can be substituted for con-
ceptualism and non-conceptualism.
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by B, though only if B can be found by C. Therefore, (NN) avoids the question-
begging problems of (Ph) and (BN), and escapes also the problem of fruitlessness, 
which is represented by (RP).
Moreover, if one is willing to interpret the concepts of “mind” and “world” 
rhetorically as a merism, then she is able to interpret the argumentative structure 
“B implies C iff C implies B” as a form of holism – but this holism is the result of 
a two-sided process and not only simple assertion. In any case, McDowell’s argu-
mentative structure shows that anti-reductionism is not just a negative reaction 
to reductionism, but can also offer a positive method and a process which goes 
dialectically from B to C and vice versa.
4.2. Dialectic as a Debate on Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism
In Section 4.1, we have seen that reductionism can be interpreted as a philosophi-
cal position that stands on one side of the gulf (B) and construes the other one 
(C) out of it, in short: B implies C. We have also seen that the anti-reductionistic 
dialectic is neither only a negative answer to reductionism nor an approach nec-
essarily identical to holism (or individualism). Instead, with McDowell anti-re-
ductionism can be interpreted in a positive way as a dialectical method or figure 
(B implies C iff C implies B). I believe that what we have said with McDowell in 
Section 4.1 could have also been exemplified by Fichte. For example, Valentin 
Pluder has done something similar with Fichte’s debate on Kant and on ideal-
ism and realism in the Science of Knowing 1804.87 For instance, Fichte demon-
strates that each idealism as well as realism maintains to take the right side of the 
gulf and to construe the opposite out of it, i.e. B implies C or C implies B. Like 
McDowell’s (Ph), (RP), etc., neither of those positions is convincing and both 
argumentation strategies just lead to higher idealisms and higher realisms that 
argue reductively in the same manner as their predecessors (normal idealism and 
realism and so on). 
Similar to McDowell, Fichte offers a  third way between idealism and real-
ism, which has a therapeutic effect on both sides. In the implementation of the 
therapy, Fichte and McDowell differ considerably from one another: while for 
McDowell the anti-reductionistic dialectic is the solution of the problem of re-
ductionism (as we have seen in Section 4.1), for Fichte dialectic itself seems to be 
87 V. Pluder, Die Vermittlung von Idealismus und Realismus, op. cit.
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the problem. For Fichte, the debate on idealism and realism, which form both 
sides of the gulf, is dialectical itself since, first of all, “dialectic” is the word that 
indicates that each of the two reductionisms in the one debate claim to be right. 
For instance, idealism argues that B implies C iff realism asserts that C implies B 
and vice versa. While for McDowell the dialectical method or figure (B implies C 
iff C implies B) is the solution to the problem of mutually incompatible reduction-
isms, Fichte argues at first that a therapy can only work on reductionism, if one is 
able to act on both sides of the gulf at the same time, e.g. by negation. The result 
that both sides calm down simultaneously will only be possible if one is willing 
to avoid the dialectical debate itself (B implies C iff C implies B). So far it looks 
as if for McDowell dialectic is the anti-reductionistic solution of the problem of 
reductionism, and as if for Fichte dialectic is the problem of reductionism that 
can bring us to anti-reductionism, on the condition of avoiding dialectic itself. 
In simple words, McDowell’s therapy seems to be a harmonization by dialectic, 
while Fichte’s therapy seems to be an amputation of dialectic. But this is just one 
insight into the science of knowing, which may later turn out to be incorrect or 
incomplete. 
Fichte goes on and argues that reductionism can be identified with ordinary 
knowing. In contrast, anti-reductionism is equal to absolute knowing. Like Rorty 
and McDowell, Fichte assures us that there is a process of edification and trans-
formation that leads from ordinary knowing to the absolute one. What makes 
Fichte interesting for us today, is the insight that ordinary knowing (reduction-
ism = ¬α) and absolute knowing (anti-reductionism = α) are themselves in a dia-
lectical relationship to one another.88 Here again (as explained in Section 2.1), the 
fundamental principle is that we can only fully understand or explain absolute 
knowing by understanding or explaining the ordinary one and vice versa. In 
other words, anti-reductionism behaves analogously to reductionism, just as ide-
alism and realism do.
From this insight, two hypotheses can be derived. (1) First of all, if anti-re-
ductionism is just one side of the gulf in opposition to reductionism, then an-
ti-reductionism cannot argue in another way than reductionism can, i.e. B im-
plies C. (2) Second, if anti-reductionism is just one side of the gulf in opposition 
to reductionism, then there can be no one-side technique of bridging the gulf 
88 However, as I pointed out above, this fertility is caused by the problem that one must either say 
that Fichte violates the rules of modern logic (which of course he does not know) or that Fichte 
cannot be interpreted meaningfully with the rules of modern logic.
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that is satisfactory or convincing, but merely a double-sided technique which is 
called “dialectic,” i.e. B implies C iff C implies B. I think that it is not necessary 
to argue in detail that both hypotheses are derived from the principles which 
were detailed before. But I will give a short comment on both hypotheses. (1) It 
might seem odd, given that anti-reductionism seems to be another form of re-
ductionism itself. But this is not, however, meant in a semantic way, but rather 
in a methodological way: anti-reductionism is the opposite of reductionism, but 
both argue against one another in the same way which originates in debates in 
which two purely reductionistic sides are involved, e.g. idealism and realism. 
(2) What initially appeared to be the problem of reductionism developed within 
Fichte’s argumentation as the endpoint of every debate with two inherently con-
tradictory positions in which each side tries to reduce the other one to itself. If it 
cannot be convincing that one position is right, Fichte tries to develop a point of 
view in which each position applies with equal accuracy and validity at the same 
time. At this point, Fichte finds out that the amputation of dialectic cannot be 
a therapy that leads from reductionism (ordinary knowing) to anti-reductionism 
(absolute knowing) since both positions form two sides of the gulf which behave 
like normal reductionism itself. Therefore, dialectic cannot be treated, but rather 
is the treatment of his therapy. 
I think that, on this issue, Fichte is close to McDowell, as we have seen at the 
end of Section 4.1. In my view, the advantage of Fichte’s doctrine is not that he 
represents an anti-reductionistic position,89 but rather that he reflects on the de-
bate of reductionism and anti-reductionism itself. 
5. Conclusion 
I will conclude by enumerating three systematic results from both approaches 
given in the previous sections that may be interesting to current debates on re-
ductionism, anti-reductionism, and dialectic:
(1) Anti-reductionism is not necessarily identical to holism or individualism, 
but it can also be equal to dialectic. Therefore, dialectic is an alternative to 
reductionism and normal anti-reductionism.
89 In this paper I have refrained from accusing McDowell of a reductionistic standpoint of concep-
tualism.
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(2) However, anti-reductionism stands in opposition to reductionism and can-
not argue in another way than reductionism can; even the double-sided 
method of dialectic is just a  one-sided attempt to bridge the gulf to 
non-dialectical positions.
(3) The debate on reductionism and anti-reductionism can at least be interpre-
ted as a form of dialectic itself in which both sides claim to be the right one 
simultaneously, which can involve the other one in or construe the other 
one out of it.
If one is looking for an answer on the question of whether McDowell or Fichte 
succeeds in showing that dialectic bridges the gulf, then I would tend to reject 
the question itself. Since dialectic is for both the method that shows how far it is 
possible to go within a debate of two incompatible positions and without arguing 
dogmatically for just one of two positions. But the only reason why I would plead 
for studying Fichte today and not only McDowell concerns the point that Fichte 
reflects on the gulf between reductionism and anti-reductionism itself, whereas 
McDowell is satisfied with having bridged the gulf between the two main reduc-
tionisms (mind and word).
Concerning our three results, the question remains if Steve Gerrard and Fiona 
Ellis could be right in criticizing the dialectician as someone who is clothed in 
“metaphysical mystery” by “building more epicycles in the metaphysical castle.”90 
I  think the criticism does not appear unjustified, but what we can learn from 
Fichte and McDowell could be that there is just one alternative to dialectic: to 
build more and more arguments in our reductionistic castles. Being a non-di-
alectician or a dialectician depends on the question of what philosophy should 
actually achieve: do we want to stand on one side and build a one-way bridge or 
do we want to visit both sides by using a two-way bridge. However, we can con-
clusively state with Rorty that “whichever happens, however, there is no danger 
of philosophy’s ‘coming to an end.’”91
90 Cf. S. Gerrard, A Philosophy of Mathematics between Two Camps, in: The Cambridge Companion 
to Wittgenstein, ed. Hans Sluga et al., Cambridge 1996, p. 171; F. Ellis, On the Dismounting of 
Seesaws, op. cit.
91 Cf. R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, op. cit., p. 394.
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Summary
“Dialectic” has been a  matter of growing interest in contemporary philoso-
phy. The present article analyzes dialectical methods and positions them by re- 
ference to two paradigmatic texts of German idealism and analytic philosophy, 
i.e. J.G. Fichte’s Science of Knowing (1804) and J. McDowell’s Mind and World. 
Both dialectical approaches will be interpreted with regard to their contribution 
in the debate on reductionism and anti-reductionism: both Fichte and McDowell 
claim that philosophical positions and logical terms stand in a dualistic relation-
ship to one another, on the one hand, but are separated by a gulf, on the other. 
I will argue that for McDowell dialectic seems to be an alternative to one-sided 
reductionisms as well as to normal anti-reductionistic holism. Furthermore, for 
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Fichte dialectic is an adequate method for describing the relationship of reduc-
tionism and anti-reductionism itself. Both see in dialectic a technique for bridg-
ing the gulf between binary opposite terms of logic as well as mutually exclusive 
positions, such as mind and world, subject and object, or idealism and realism.
Key words: dialectic, reductionism, anti-reductionism, conceptualism, bridge 
principles
Streszczenie
Techniki budowania mostu nad przepaścią: dialektyka i redukcjonizm 
u McDowella i Fichtego
We współczesnej filozofii „dialektyka” cieszy się rosnącym zainteresowaniem. 
Artykuł ten analizuje metody dialektyczne i rozważa je w odniesieniu do dwóch 
paradygmatycznych tekstów z obszarów idealizmu niemieckiego i filozofii anali-
tycznej, tj. Teorii wiedzy J.G. Fichtego (1804) oraz Umysłu i świata J. McDowella. 
Przedstawione w nich ujęcia dialektyczne zostaną zinterpretowane w kontekście 
ich wkładu do debaty na temat redukcjonizmu i antyredukcjonizmu. Zarówno 
Fichte, jak i McDowell uważają, że stanowiska filozoficzne oraz terminy logiczne: 
z jednej strony są ze sobą powiązane, z drugiej zaś – oddzielone są od siebie prze-
paścią. Pokażę, że dla McDowella dialektyka wydaje się alternatywą zarówno dla 
jednostronnego redukcjonizmu, jak i dla normalnego antyredukcjonistycznego 
holizmu. Ponadto zaś – że dla Fichtego dialektyka jest adekwatną metodą opisy-
wania relacji między redukcjonizmem i  antyredukcjonizmem. Obaj myśliciele 
widzą w dialektyce technikę budowania mostu nad przepaścią rozciągającą się 
pomiędzy binarnie przeciwnymi terminami logicznymi, a także pomiędzy tym, 
co zdaje się wzajemnie wykluczać, jak umysł i świat, podmiot i przedmiot czy 
idealizm i realizm.
Słowa kluczowe: dialektyka, redukcjonizm, antyredukcjonizm, konceptualizm, 
zasady pomostowe
